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This paper integrates and extends the literatures on industry evolution and dominant ﬁrms to develop adynamic theory of dominant and fringe competitive interaction in a segmented industry. It argues that a
dominant ﬁrm, seeing contraction of growth in its current segment(s), enters new segments in which it can
exploit its technological strengths, but that are sufﬁciently distant to avoid cannibalization. The dominant ﬁrm
acts as a low-cost Stackelberg leader, driving down prices and triggering a sales takeoff in the new segment.
We identify a “churn” effect associated with dominant ﬁrm entry: fringe ﬁrms that precede the dominant ﬁrm
into the segment tend to exit the segment, while new fringe ﬁrms enter, causing a net increase in the number
of ﬁrms in the segment. As the segment matures and sales decline in the segment, the process repeats itself. We
examine the predictions of the theory with a study of price, quantity, entry, and exit across 24 product classes
in the desktop laser printer industry from 1984 to 1996. Using descriptive statistics, hazard rate models, and
panel data methods, we ﬁnd empirical support for the theoretical predictions.
Key words : competitive dynamics; industry evolution; dominant ﬁrms
History : Accepted by Bruno Cassiman and Pankaj Ghemawat, special issue editors; received February 20,
2006. This paper was with the authors 3 months for 1 revision.
1. Introduction
The literature on industry evolution ﬁnds that the
number of ﬁrms in an industry increases to a peak
and then declines to a roughly steady-state number.
This pattern has been attributed to competition and
legitimation (Hannan and Freeman 1989), different
cost structures of entrants and incumbents (Jovanovic
and MacDonald 1994), and the technological prowess
of incumbents relative to entrants (Klepper 2002).
Recent research that has analyzed this pattern with
more detailed data has noted a “sales takeoff” accom-
panying the increase in the number of ﬁrms in the
industry. This has generally been attributed to the
entry of ﬁrms with a lower (marginal) cost position.
These ﬁrms shift the supply curve down and conse-
quently cause the quantity of goods sold to increase
(Bass 1980, Stoneman and Ireland 1983, Gort and
Klepper 1982, Goldner and Tellis 1997). More recent
work has argued that the sales takeoff is due not only
to a shift in the supply curve, but also to an outward
shift in the demand curve (Agarwal and Bayus 2002).
While these outcomes have been well documented
(Gort and Klepper 1982, Agarwal and Gort 2002), the
analysis of the causal mechanisms remains somewhat
incomplete. Because data are usually aggregated at a
high level in cross-industry studies focusing on indus-
try-level dynamics, the current literature has not been
able to identify one of the key causal mechanisms
for a sales takeoff: entry or expansion by a domi-
nant ﬁrm. Similarly, this industry-level focus, which
assumes homogeneity in industry demand, has pre-
cluded study of the evolution of segments within an
industry.1
This paper extends the industry evolution literature
by developing a theory of the evolution of segmented
industries, an area in which there is very little extant
theory. A dominant ﬁrm expands within its exist-
ing segment until growth in that segment slackens.
This causes the ﬁrm to selectively enter new segments
in which it can exploit its technological capabilities
but avoid cannibalization of its current products. The
dominant ﬁrm acts as a Stackelberg leader, triggering
a price decline, sales takeoff, and change in the pat-
tern of entry and exit by fringe ﬁrms in that segment.
1 The organizational ecology literature has studied density depen-
dence in niches within a population. However, this is primarily
viewed through the lens of legitimation and competition, rather
than through the economic dynamics of industry evolution.
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This dynamic cycle repeats itself when growth in the
new segment falls. To test the predictions of the the-
ory, we adopt a novel empirical approach to explore
dominant ﬁrm entry and its consequences for fringe
ﬁrms. We study a single industry—the desktop laser
printer industry—that is composed of several identi-
ﬁable market segments. By studying the entry of the
same dominant ﬁrm into different segments at dif-
ferent points in time, we are able to conduct multi-
ple “experiments” while holding basic features of the
industry and the players constant.
Our paper integrates economic and management
theory on industry evolution to make three contri-
butions to the literature. First, rather than examine
dynamics at the aggregate industry level, our work
examines how an industry evolves in different seg-
ments, and to what extent the theoretical predictions
and empirical regularities found in the aforemen-
tioned literature inform the way in which segments
develop in an industry. The evolution of multiple seg-
ments allows relationships between related segments
to be considered through panel-data methods, and
also allows us to extend theory to a more ﬁne-grained
level than this literature has previously considered.
Second, using segment-level microdata that have
not been employed before in studies of this type, we
shine new light on stylized facts from the industry
evolution and dominant ﬁrm literatures. We show
that the simultaneous or delayed correlation between
entry and sales found in other studies is not due
solely to the entry of fringe ﬁrms moving the sup-
ply curve or shifting demand. Rather, the entry of
the dominant ﬁrm alters supply and demand lead-
ing to price declines and the sales takeoff. The strate-
gic selection of segments by the dominant ﬁrm can
have a signiﬁcant effect on whether a sales takeoff
occurs. With respect to the literature on the dominant
ﬁrm, theoretical models typically begin with the for-
mation of such a ﬁrm, and explore theoretically or
empirically how such a ﬁrm defends its position by
applying dynamic limit pricing to manage the trade-
off between high current proﬁts and increased future
competition (Kamien and Schwartz 1971, Caves et al.
1984). In this sense, the literature is static and usu-
ally considers the dominant ﬁrm solely in a defensive
posture. Integrating these literatures with a compre-
hensive data set on the laser printer industry allows
us to provide a much more complete picture of the
sales takeoff, dominant ﬁrm behavior, and industry
evolution.
Third, this paper explores the behavior and het-
erogeneity of fringe ﬁrms. We show that once the
dominant ﬁrm enters, a swarm of fringe ﬁrms fol-
lows the dominant ﬁrm in, most likely in expectation
of the sales takeoff. At the same time, fringe ﬁrms
that precede the dominant ﬁrm into the segment tend
to exit after dominant ﬁrm entry. This suggests that
some fringe ﬁrms develop strategies, structures, and
capabilities suitable for success in the presence of a
dominant ﬁrm—perhaps entailing a low-cost struc-
ture and an ability to take advantage of positive exter-
nalities created by the dominant ﬁrm—while other
fringe ﬁrms conﬁgure their resources to succeed in
the selection environment that exists before entry of
a dominant ﬁrm. It is the entry and exit decisions by
small ﬁrms before, during, and after dominant ﬁrm
entry that causes a large amount of “churn” in the
segment, with both entry and exit rates increasing
with arrival of the dominant ﬁrm. Many of the exit-
ing ﬁrms move to new segments, which the dominant
ﬁrm may subsequently enter, thus leading to a churn-
ing of the same ﬁrms once again.
We conduct our empirical examination of the the-
oretical predictions using data on the desktop laser
printer industry from 1984 to 1996. Hewlett-Packard
(HP) pioneered this industry in 1984, maintained at
least 45% market share through 1996, and was widely
perceived as the dominant player (de Figueiredo and
Kyle 2005). We ﬁnd empirical support for most of our
theoretical predictions. In particular, we show that HP
enters new segments when sales in its current seg-
ments stagnate or decline. The new segments that HP
enters are related to HP’s existing segments, in a man-
ner suggesting that HP can exploit its existing techno-
logical capabilities in them (consistent with Klepper
2002). However, HP tends to avoid segments that are
adjacent to its current segments in favor of segments
further away, as long as such segments exist (consis-
tent with Katz 1984). Furthermore, HP’s entry is pos-
itively associated with a substantial price decline and
a dramatic sales increase in a segment. Our evidence
indicates that the dominant ﬁrm’s entry triggers these
changes in the segment. Finally, HP’s entry precipi-
tates a churning of fringe ﬁrms—increased entry rates
following HP’s entry, and increased exit rates for
ﬁrms that entered the segment before HP entered.
Although this study does not explore in detail the
speciﬁc characteristics of fringe ﬁrms that encourage
entry versus exit upon the entry of a dominant ﬁrm,
we hope that it will encourage further work in this
area. More broadly, we hope that this study will open
up new avenues of research on the strategic dynamics
in segmented industries and on dominant ﬁrm-fringe
ﬁrm interactions.
2. Theoretical Development and
Framework
2.1. Preliminaries: Deﬁnition of the Dominant
Firm and Summary of Theory
In theoretical treatments of dominant ﬁrm behavior,
dominance is deﬁned by two characteristics: posses-
sion of a cost advantage and ability to price as a
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Figure 1 Dynamic Cycle in a Segmented Industry
Maturity and profit decline
(demand falls)
Dominant firm
enters new segment
Price drop and
sales takeoff
Shifts and elasticity
changes of demand
and supply curves
Churn:
Fringe firms enter
and exit segment
Note. Neighboring stages may happen contemporaneously.
Stackelberg leader (Gaskins 1971, Caves et al. 1984).
These characteristics imply that a dominant ﬁrm
should be characterized by substantial market share.
Empirical studies of dominant ﬁrms have identiﬁed
dominance primarily by a ﬁrm’s market share, with a
share of 40% or 50% used as the typical threshold for
dominance (Yamawaki 1985, White 1981). We follow
this convention, assuming in our theory that a dom-
inant ﬁrm behaves as a low-cost Stackelberg leader
and empirically identifying HP as the sole dominant
ﬁrm in the laser printer industry based on a market
share threshold of 40%.
With this deﬁnition, Figure 1 outlines the basic
dynamic theoretical framework developed to explain
the timing and direction of dominant ﬁrm entry and
the response of fringe ﬁrms in a multisegment market,
and in particular, in the desktop laser printer indus-
try. The next four subsections explore this framework
in detail, but the basic outline is as follows: The dom-
inant ﬁrm focuses on competing within its existing
segment until it encounters reduced (expected) prof-
itability in that segment, due to declining price or
declining sales growth or both. This triggers the ﬁrm’s
entry into a new segment where it can better uti-
lize its resources and investment. The selection of
the new segment balances the tension between two
basic forces: the ﬁrm’s desire to exploit its innovative
capabilities and its desire to avoid cannibalization of
its current product portfolio. This causes a dominant
ﬁrm to seek segments in which it can exploit its exist-
ing technological capabilities, but to skip neighboring
segments to avoid cannibalization. When the domi-
nant ﬁrm enters a new segment, it acts as a low-cost
Stackelberg price leader, setting prices that are below
those of the fringe ﬁrms already in the segment. This
sparks a sales takeoff.
Fringe ﬁrms, in turn, respond to the entry of the
dominant ﬁrm. A set of fringe ﬁrms whose resources
and capabilities are well suited for competing in the
shadow of the dominant ﬁrm enter the segment on
the heels of the dominant ﬁrm. However, incumbent
fringe ﬁrms tend to exit the segment, presumably
because their resources and capabilities, although ap-
propriate for the pre-dominant ﬁrm period, are not
well suited for the selection environment in the post-
dominant ﬁrm era. This entry and exit behavior by
these different types of ﬁrms results in a churn in
the segment. Many of the exiting fringe ﬁrms con-
tinue to compete in other segments of the industry,
often entering new segments as they exit the exist-
ing one. Ultimately, this segment experiences sales
growth decline, and the cycle begins again.
2.2. Moving the Giant: What Motivates the
Firms to Move?
There are many motivating factors that may cause a
dominant ﬁrm to seek new segments. We focus on
three: (1) the proﬁtability of the current segment,
(2) the proﬁtability of the potential segment, and
(3) the costs the ﬁrm faces in moving from one seg-
ment to another (costs of growth). Assume that the
dominant ﬁrm exists in a market segment, Segment 1.
If the ﬁrm can expand costlessly, then the proﬁtabil-
ity of Segment 1 should have no effect on the ﬁrm’s
decision to enter Segment 2; rather, the ﬁrm moves
into Segment 2 if the new segment is sufﬁciently
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attractive. For a ﬁrm that faces adjustment costs for
expansion, notably an increasing marginal cost of
growth in a given segment as well as a ﬁxed cost
of expanding into new segments (e.g., Klepper 1996,
2002), the calculus is different. In this case, expand-
ing into Segment 2 occurs only if it is more attractive
than growing in Segment 1; thus, the proﬁtability of
both segments drives the entry decision. The ﬁrm will
enter Segment 2 only if the discounted expected prof-
its from Segment 2 minus the expansion and growth
costs are greater than the discounted expected proﬁts
from Segment 1 minus the growth costs.2 Assuming
that the dominant ﬁrm’s costs do not change over
time within a segment, it is straightforward to see
that as quantity or price drops in Segment 1, ceteris
paribus, the hurdle for entering Segment 2 declines.
That is, demand slowdown in one segment creates
opportunities to grow in new segments (e.g., free-
ing factory capacity that can be used to grow into
Segment 2).
Hypothesis 1 (H1). When there are growth costs, a
market price or sales drop in a dominant ﬁrm’s existing
segment(s), ceteris paribus, makes it more likely to enter a
new segment.
2.3. The Dominant Firm’s Entry Decision:
Which Segment?
How does a dominant ﬁrm choose which new seg-
ment to enter? Theoretical and empirical evidence
on diversiﬁcation indicates that a ﬁrm will enter
new industries in which it can exploit its existing
technological capabilities (Silverman 1999, Helfat and
Lieberman 2002). In a formal treatment of this ques-
tion, Klepper (2002) develops a model that describes
industry evolution in terms of entry, innovation,
growth, and exit of both new ﬁrms and diversifying
ﬁrms in an industry. Much of Klepper’s model turns
on the differential research productivity of large ﬁrms,
whereby those ﬁrms whose research efforts are more
productive in an industry ultimately are more suc-
cessful and are therefore more likely to enter in the
ﬁrst place. In a study of the television manufacturing
industry, Klepper and Simons (2000) ﬁnd support for
this: producers of home radios (whose R&D expertise
was directly useful in TV production) were among the
earliest and most successful entrants to this industry;
the larger and more experienced were these ﬁrms in
home radios, the more likely their entry and success
in television production.
To the extent that distinct product segments within
an industry are conceptually similar to distinct indus-
tries, a similar pattern in segment entry will exist.
2 This could be stated mathematically as E
∫ 
t0
p2 − c2q2 · dt
 >
E
∫ 
t0
p1−c1q1 ·dt
−m, where pi, ci, qi are the price, cost, and quan-
tity of segment i, m is the cost of expansion, and t0 is the time of
entry into class i.
Indeed, in a study of entry by incumbents into
new “subﬁelds” within the medical device industry,
Mitchell (1989) found that these ﬁrms readily entered
those subﬁelds in which their ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets—
including technological resources—provide value, and
less readily entered subﬁelds that would beneﬁt less
from their ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets.
Hypothesis 2 (H2). A ﬁrm will be more likely to enter
a segment in which it can exploit its existing technological
capabilities relative to segments in which it cannot exploit
these capabilities.
The above hypothesis suggests that ﬁrms will enter
segments where they can exploit economies of scope
in the direction of their research capability. This is
frequently taken to mean that a ﬁrm will choose to
enter “nearby” or “proximate” segments because a
ﬁrm’s research capability (and other assets) is likely
to decrease in value as distance in product space
increases (e.g., Wernerfelt and Montgomery 1988).
However, there is a tension between the production-
driven prediction above and concerns raised when
considering the demand and competitive implications
of segment entry. As a large literature on product line
decisions (e.g., Moorthy 1984) and multiproduct entry
(e.g., Brander and Eaton 1984) demonstrates, a ﬁrm
that introduces products that are too proximate risks
cannibalizing its own higher-margin products. This is
exacerbated in the face of actual or potential compe-
tition: when a ﬁrm competes in multiple product seg-
ments in close proximity to each other such that they
are partial substitutes, the ﬁrm has particularly weak
incentives to behave aggressively with respect to any
one of the product segments because increased com-
petition in that segment will not only reduce proﬁts
in that segment but will draw demand from the prof-
itable proximate segment (Katz 1984, Judd 1985, Desai
2001). Recognizing this, potential and actual rivals
can take advantage of the multiproduct ﬁrm’s muted
incentives. Consequently, while a dominant ﬁrm has
a supply-side incentive to enter segments that are
proximate, the ﬁrm also has a demand-side incen-
tive to enter segments that are more distant, hence,
less directly substitutable. This implies that even as it
enters new segments to exploit its research strength,
the ﬁrm will have an incentive to avoid immediately
adjacent segments. If this incentive is strong enough,
then the ﬁrm will “skip” segments to avoid canni-
balization of existing products and to remain credibly
aggressive in each segment.
In contrast, to the extent that fringe ﬁrms are price-
takers in their markets, a fringe ﬁrm will be less
concerned about a commitment to aggressive com-
petitive behavior. We therefore expect fringe ﬁrms to
be attracted to adjacent segments to best exploit their
existing capabilities.
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Hypothesis 3A (H3A). A fringe ﬁrm will be more
likely to enter a segment adjacent to its existing segment(s)
relative to segments further away.
Hypothesis 3B (H3B). A dominant ﬁrm will be less
likely to enter a segment adjacent to its existing segment(s)
relative to segments further away.
2.4. Prices and Demand
Previous studies on industry evolution have noted a
substantial price decline and sales takeoff contem-
poraneous with, or subsequent to, the entry of new
ﬁrms. These studies have attributed this price and
quantity change to an outward shift in the sup-
ply curve caused by new, low-cost entrants (Goldner
and Tellis 1997, Bass 1980), and an outward shift in
the demand curve caused by product improve-
ments, expanded distribution, and increased con-
sumer awareness (Agarwal and Bayus 2002). There is
a third (not mutually exclusive) possibility: the de-
mand curve can become more elastic over time. These
three cases are brieﬂy discussed below, and the elec-
tronic appendix develops them in greater detail (pro-
vided in the e-companion).3
Our theory takes these ideas and further explains a
causal mechanism of the sales takeoff by introducing
two new elements: a dominant ﬁrm and a segmented
industry. To date, there is very little theory integrating
industry evolution, dominant ﬁrms, and segmented
markets creating, what we believe, is an opportunity
to explore the dynamics of supply and demand in
these cases. As such, our model opens the door to
further theoretical and empirical analysis of segment
evolution.
In our model, the dominant ﬁrm could cause all
three of the demand and supply effects noted above.
With respect to shifting the supply curve, the dom-
inant ﬁrm maintains a marginal cost advantage de-
rived from its ability to achieve higher economies
of scale and its investment in cost-reducing R&D
(Klepper 1996). The proﬁt-maximizing price for a
Stackelberg dominant ﬁrm is thus lower than the
proﬁt-maximizing price of a higher-cost fringe ﬁrm
(Saloner et al. 2001). Entry of the dominant ﬁrm into
a segment will lead to a fall in equilibrium prices and,
consequently, a sales takeoff.
With respect to shifting the demand curve, the dom-
inant ﬁrm can increase product awareness through
branding and advertising (Agarwal and Bayus 2002).
Anderson and Tushman (1990) study the establish-
ment of a dominant design in several industries
and ﬁnd that industry sales rise dramatically after
a dominant design is established. Although this is
3 An electronic companion to this paper is available as part of the
online version that can be found at http://mansci.journal.informs.
org/.
distinct from the entry of a dominant ﬁrm, Ander-
son and Tushman note that the presence of a “dom-
inant producer” can serve to convince customers
that uncertainty about the industry’s products has
been resolved, and thus encourage them to increase
their purchasing. This will also cause a sales take-
off because the demand shift will independently lead
to more potential buyers entering the market. Note,
however, that in the absence of an accompanying sup-
ply shift or in the presence of small or moderate sup-
ply shift, the demand shift will actually cause prices
to rise as unit sales increase—contrary to the ﬁndings
in most empirical work in the area.
Third, and related to the demand shift, a domi-
nant ﬁrm’s entry can also change the elasticity, or
shape, of the demand curve in a segment by chang-
ing some buyers’ willingness to pay (WTP) more than
others. Previous scholars have largely overlooked this
possibility. This is different from shifting demand,
as the change in elasticity has a distinct effect on
optimal price. The demand curve will become more
elastic if low-WTP consumers increase their WTP (dif-
ferentially more than high-WTP buyers) because of
advertising, brand awareness, or more legitimacy con-
ferred to the segment (Haveman 1993). It is likely
that smaller ﬁrms will have difﬁculty replicating this
effect, given that new, small ﬁrms in new industries
suffer from a legitimacy problem that slows sales
(Aldrich and Fiol 1994).
Given that the increased WTP associated with dom-
inant ﬁrm entry will likely affect those at the bottom
of the demand curve, below the current equilibrium
price, the increasing elasticity of demand by itself will
have no effect on equilibrium sales or price. However,
combined with a supply shift, an increase in demand
elasticity will magnify the sales increase, while atten-
uating the price decline somewhat.
Thus, with a sufﬁciently large shift in demand, a
sales takeoff can be associated with either a decline
or increase in segment price. However, to the extent
that the combination of supply shift and change in
elasticity of demand exceed a demand shift, a sales
takeoff will be associated with a decline in price. For
the reasons described above, we expect the entry of
a dominant ﬁrm into a segment to have a signiﬁcant
impact on both supply and the elasticity of demand.
Thus, we predict:
Hypothesis 4 (H4). After a dominant ﬁrm enters a
segment, the price decline in that segment will accelerate.
Hypothesis 5 (H5). After a dominant ﬁrm enters a
segment, sales in that segment will increase.
One concern might arise regarding these hypothe-
ses. If the dominant ﬁrm is unusually good at fore-
casting future demand, then the sales takeoff could
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be a result of demand forecasting rather than demand
creation, as posited by the theory. While we cannot
deﬁnitively rule out the possibility of demand fore-
casting, we can point to a number of pieces of evi-
dence that suggest this is not the case. We examine
this logic in §4 and the electronic appendix.
2.5. The Effect of the Dominant Firm’s Entry on
Fringe Firms
The ﬁnal piece of the dynamic process is an analysis
of what happens to fringe ﬁrms’ entry and exit behav-
ior when a dominant ﬁrm enters the segment. Current
theoretical thinking on this topic yields ambiguous
results. On one hand, the neoclassical model argues
that dominant ﬁrms will drive out fringe ﬁrms be-
cause the dominant ﬁrm will be able to exploit
economies of scale in its operations. Moreover, as a
dominant ﬁrm increases competitive pressure within
a segment due to enhanced research productivity and
its incentive to invest heavily in R&D, such entry
should encourage fringe ﬁrm exit and discourage sub-
sequent fringe ﬁrm entry (Klepper 1996). On the other
hand, models of dominant ﬁrm behavior sometimes
derive conditions in which the dominant ﬁrm will
set a price umbrella that allows fringe ﬁrms in the
market to prosper (Gaskins 1971), attenuating com-
petitive pressure. Further, if entry by a dominant ﬁrm
provides a positive signal about future demand in a
given segment, then this should cause fringe ﬁrms to
follow a dominant ﬁrm in the expectation that doing
so will lead them to attractive segments (Haveman
1993). Thus, the dominant ﬁrm’s entry might attract
fringe ﬁrm entry and discourage exit.
We propose that the entry of the dominant ﬁrm
causes both of these effects, leading to churn in the
segment. There are two basic types of fringe ﬁrms:
those whose capabilities and resources are well suited
to proﬁting in a segment with a dominant ﬁrm,
and those whose capabilities and resources are not
well suited to this situation. When the dominant
ﬁrm enters the segment, the competitive landscape
changes. As often happens when a discrete event such
as an innovation or regulatory change occurs, ﬁrms
that were in the segment prior to the event are likely
to exit because they are poorly equipped to face the
new market conditions (Henderson and Clark 1990,
Nickerson and Silverman 2003). Another set of ﬁrms
will enter after the event to take advantage of the
new conditions (Anderson and Tushman 1990). These
ﬁrms are more likely to survive post-dominant ﬁrm
entry because they are equipped to compete in such
conditions. In this sense, fringe ﬁrms are not homo-
geneous as the literature has suggested (e.g., Hannan
and Freeman 1989), but rather are heterogeneous in
their resources and capabilities. Dominant ﬁrm entry
causes the combination of these two events—the exit
of incumbent fringe ﬁrms and entry of new fringe
ﬁrms—resulting in substantial churn in the segment.4
Hypothesis 6 (H6). Dominant ﬁrm entry in a seg-
ment will be accompanied by a wave of fringe ﬁrm entry
in that segment.
Hypothesis 7 (H7). Ceteris paribus, fringe ﬁrms that
are in a segment before the dominant ﬁrm enters are more
likely to exit the segment than ﬁrms that enter after the
dominant ﬁrm enters.
The dynamic cycle of the interaction between the
dominant and fringe ﬁrms then repeats itself as
demand growth in the focal segment declines. Hav-
ing developed a framework for thinking about the
dynamics of dominant and fringe ﬁrm behavior in
the context of a multisegment industry’s evolution,
we turn to an empirical evaluation of the framework
using data from the desktop laser printer industry.
3. The Laser Printer Industry
As the personal computer market expanded in the
1980s, so too did the market for desktop printers
in the United States. HP introduced the ﬁrst desk-
top laser printer for the retail market in 1984. By the
end of 1985, 17 ﬁrms had introduced 23 models of
printers. At its peak in 1990, the industry had more
than 100 ﬁrms, but by 1996 the number of ﬁrms had
fallen to 87. HP maintained at least 45% U.S. mar-
ket share each year between 1984 and 1996. Three
other ﬁrms (Apple, Fujitsu, and IBM/Lexmark) held
between 10% and 20% market share for at least one
year. No other ﬁrm held more than 9% market share
during any year. Thus, HP is the sole dominant ﬁrm
in this industry, and all other ﬁrms are fringe ﬁrms.5
A desktop laser printer is made, essentially, of three
main components—laser engine, controller card (the
electronics), and exterior features such as toner car-
tridge, feeder tray, and plastic outside box. To cre-
ate a printed page, the paper passes from the feeder
tray to the laser engine, where the page is electrically
charged. Fine-grain toner of the opposite charge is
attracted to the paper, heated, and fused to the page
4 It is beyond the scope of this paper to identify the distinct char-
acteristics of ﬁrms that precede versus follow the dominant ﬁrm
into a market. However, some possibilities are that followers have
low-cost positions, high-quality products, or marketing structures
designed to beneﬁt from the positive externalities of the dominant
ﬁrm’s advertising expenditure. We return to this in §§4 and 5.
5 Our empirical results hold if we expand the deﬁnition of domi-
nant ﬁrm to include Apple, Fujitsu, and IBM/Lexmark. Note that
“fringe ﬁrm” indicates that a ﬁrm held a small market share in this
industry. It does not necessarily mean that the ﬁrm itself is small.
For example, Ricoh, Xerox, and Okidata are deﬁned as fringe ﬁrms
in this industry, although they are large companies based on their
other businesses.
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Figure 2 Product Distribution and Classes
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by the fuser assembly of the laser engine. The paper is
then ejected to the exterior paper tray. The controller
card governs the process and provides the many fea-
tures that a given laser printer offers.
The vast majority of laser printer producers pur-
chase laser engines on the open market, choosing
among 20 suppliers.6 Canon is the dominant sup-
plier, with 60% market share and 90% share of HP’s
purchases during the sample period. In contrast, the
majority of laser printer producers make their own
controller cards. Finally, virtually all laser printer mak-
ers purchase exterior features on the open market.
Two features of the laser printer industry are par-
ticularly salient to this study. First, the key character-
istics of a laser printer are speed, measured in pages
per minute (PPM), and resolution, measured in dots
per inch (DPI). These are the two characteristics most
prominently assessed in popular press rankings of
printers (e.g., Consumer Reports 2005). Additionally, in
a hedonic analysis of laser printers, de Figueiredo and
Kyle (2005, 2006) ﬁnd that speed and resolution are
two of the most important characteristics (with mem-
ory being a third important characteristic). Figure 2
provides the location in PPM-DPI space of each laser
printer model introduced between 1984 and 1996.
Each circle represents a printer model. A striking fea-
ture of this scatterplot is that printers are clustered
tightly into distinct groups in this space. To iden-
tify the product classes, or segments, in this industry
6 Exceptions include Fujitsu and Ricoh, which are vertically inte-
grated into printers and engines. Even these ﬁrms typically offer
their engines for sale on the open market within a few months of
introducing their own printers with such engines, thus enjoying
only a very short period of internal-only use.
we pursued three avenues. First, we used the cluster-
ing in Figure 2 and accompanying statistical tests to
identify segments where printers of roughly the same
DPI and PPM are located together (see de Figueiredo
and Kyle 2006 for more details). Second, we con-
sulted trade journals and research reports to deter-
mine how experts segmented the industry. Finally, we
met with ﬁrm managers to determine how they and
their customers thought about segments and compe-
tition. From this we developed the 24 product classes
in Figure 2.
Through 1996, there was little change in this clas-
siﬁcation scheme. Beginning in 1997, with technologi-
cal advances in color printers, multifunction printers,
and network printers, the segment deﬁnitions began
to become more blurred. Hence, our data purpose-
fully stop in 1996. These are the segments that we use
to examine entry and exit patterns in these data. We
have experimented with small changes to the segment
deﬁnitions, and they do not change the qualitative
results presented in this paper.
Second, the locus of innovation differs between
these two characteristics. Speed is largely determined
by innovations in the laser engine. The speed with
which a printer operates is a mechanical process that
is constrained by the maximum speed of the laser
engine. Although a laser printer producer can slow
down the speed of an engine through the code on
the controller card, it is difﬁcult for a printer to print
faster than its designated engine speed. Thus, inno-
vation in the PPM dimension is driven largely by
engine manufacturers. In contrast, although resolu-
tion depends in part on the engine, it is also deter-
mined substantially by the controller card. Notably,
software techniques can raise the resolution of a
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Figure 3 Entry into Laser Printer Product Classes
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printer through various mechanisms (e.g., offsetting
the electrical charges by a half a step). Thus, inno-
vation in resolution can be driven by the printer
producer’s research capability in achieving particular
DPI ranges.
This has implications for the empirical testing of
the hypotheses derived above. Because innovation by
laser printer ﬁrms is centered around the software
that supports particular levels of printer resolution,
while innovation along the speed dimension is gener-
ally undertaken by laser engine suppliers and hence
purchased through the market for engines, the ﬁrm-
speciﬁc research capabilities of laser printer ﬁrms are
thus likely to be specialized to particular DPIs. These
capabilities can be combined with different engines
to serve segments with different PPM requirements.
To the extent that a laser printer ﬁrm seeks to enter
classes where it can exploit its existing technologi-
cal capabilities, such a ﬁrm is likely to enter new
PPM classes within its existing DPI range. In contrast,
entering new DPI classes within an existing PPM
range offers fewer opportunities for a printer ﬁrm to
exploit its ﬁrm-speciﬁc research capability.
Figure 3 shows the pattern of class entry by HP and
pioneering fringe ﬁrms. Three features stand out.
First, in seven of these classes fringe ﬁrm entry pre-
cedes HP entry, which allows for comparison of com-
petitive processes before and after HP’s entry. Second,
the initial dates of entry indicate that, over time,
ﬁrms have pioneered increasingly high-resolution
classes. In contrast, ﬁrms generally began in the center
of PPM space and have moved into both higher-
and lower-speed classes, suggesting a “dual fron-
tier” of innovation (de Figueiredo and Kyle 2006).
The variation in pioneering dates of classes raises
the possibility that exogenous factors, such as tech-
nological constraints, may have made some classes
infeasible for entry in early years of the industry. In
our statistical analyses below, we deal with this by
considering a class to be “at risk” of entry only once
it has been entered by at least one ﬁrm.7
Third, HP ultimately enters nine of the 24 segments.
HP’s entry is particularly prevalent in the lower-
resolution segments. HP also appears to “skip” seg-
ments in PPM space. For example, HP competes in
Classes 1, 9, and 21, but chooses not to enter Class 5
(which is adjacent to 1 and 9 in PPM space) or 13 or 17
(which are adjacent to 9 and 21, respectively). Thus,
rather than extending its product line to the most
proximate segment, where one might expect its exist-
ing advantages to be most leverageable, HP chooses
to locate further away.8 We explore this statistically
below.
4. Empirical Analysis
We compiled life histories of each product and ﬁrm in
the desktop laser printer industry, from its inception in
7 Another concern could be that Canon, as the dominant supplier
to this industry, might inﬂuence segment entry and sales pat-
terns. Notably, if Canon were to sell printers only (or ﬁrst) to HP,
and Canon engines drive customer demand, then the association
between HP’s entry and the sales takeoff could be spurious. To
assuage this concern, we note that Canon engines appear in at least
one model in every populated segment of the industry. Also, in
every segment that HP enters, at least one ﬁrm that preceded HP
into the segment used Canon engines before HP’s entry.
8 Ultimately, however, HP faces a trade-off between staying in its
existing resolution range and avoiding adjacent segments. At this
point (1992–1993), HP begins to locate in neighboring segments
rather than move to a new resolution range, although HP’s ﬁnal
entry in 1996 is to a nonadjacent segment in a new resolution range.
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1984 to 1996. Our primary data source was Dataquest’s
annual SpecCheck report on page printers, which is
the single most comprehensive public database on
these printers. SpecCheck provides information on a
variety of printer characteristics including manufac-
turer, initial ship date, speed in PPM, resolution in
DPI, and other features. To ﬁll in missing data from
early years in the industry, we supplemented this
data source with information from PC Magazine and
PC World. In addition, we obtained price and quan-
tity data from a separate, nonpublic Dataquest market
research database and from a private consulting ﬁrm
that had engaged in a long-term study of this indus-
try. We believe that the resulting data set is the most
comprehensive available. Over the 13-year period, we
recorded 3,836 printer-year observations that aggre-
gate up to 1,882 ﬁrm-class-year observations.
To test our hypotheses, we analyze entry into and
exit from product classes, both at the ﬁrm and the
class level. We also analyze the effect of dominant
ﬁrm entry on price and sales unit volume. Conse-
quently, we construct ﬁve distinct dependent vari-
ables to support these analyses.
1. Entryijt is a categorical variable set equal to one
if ﬁrm i enters class j in year t, and zero otherwise.
Firm i enters class j when it introduces its ﬁrst prod-
uct into that class. Subsequent introductions by ﬁrm i
of additional products into that class are not consid-
ered entries.
2. EntryCountjt is a count of the number of ﬁrms
that enter class j in year t.
3. Pricekijt is measured as the price charged for
printer k produced by ﬁrm i in class j in year t. We
report models using the list price because the list price
data are signiﬁcantly more complete than the street
price data. Results using the street price data are sub-
stantively the same.
4. UnitSalesjt is measured as the natural log of the
number of printer units sold (plus 1) in class j in
year t. Unit sales data, by printer model, is aggregated
at the class-year level.
5. Exitijt is a categorical variable set equal to one if
ﬁrm i exits class j in year t, and zero otherwise. Firm i
exits class j when it ceases to ship any product in that
class. If ﬁrm i withdraws one or more products from
class j , but continues to sell at least one other product
in that class, it does not exit the class.
We employ a variety of independent variables that
measure the sales growth in classes, the degree of
competition in the focal class, the number of classes
in which the focal ﬁrm participates, timing of entry
of the focal ﬁrm, timing of HP’s entry (interacted
with other variables), and several clocks that mea-
sure elapsed time from a relevant event. These vari-
ables are deﬁned in Table 1. Descriptive statistics can
be found in Table EC.1 of the electronic appendix.
The mean Price charged for a printer between 1984
and 1996 is $4,240. The mean UnitSales for a class dur-
ing this time period is roughly 117,000 units per year.
However, unit sales vary tremendously from zero in
some class years to more than 1,000,000 in others.
To test our ﬁrm-level hypotheses about entry and
exit, we estimate piecewise hazard rate models of the
probability of a ﬁrm entering or exiting a given class.9
To test our class-level hypotheses about entry, where
the dependent variable is a count, we estimate nega-
tive binomial models. Finally, to test our hypotheses
about price and sales, where the dependent variables
are continuous, we estimate ordinary least squares
(OLS) models with class random effects. The results
presented here are largely robust if we expand our
deﬁnition of dominant ﬁrm to include ﬁrms that have
10% market share in a given year.
4.1. Results
4.1.1. Entry. Table 2 presents results of our tests
of Hypotheses 1–3, concerning the timing and direc-
tion of entry into new classes by dominant and
fringe ﬁrms in the laser printer industry. To exam-
ine whether Hypothesis 1 is valid, we examine how
a change in quantity sold in a dominant ﬁrm’s exist-
ing segment affects the probability the ﬁrm will enter
a new segment. To test Hypothesis 2, we explore
whether ﬁrms that enter new segments pursue seg-
ments in the same DPI range as their existing seg-
ments, thus exploiting their current DPI capabilities.
Finally, to test Hypotheses 3A and 3B, we examine
whether dominant and fringe ﬁrms skip neighboring
segments when they choose new segments to enter.
To gain initial traction on these hypotheses, we look
at the descriptive data. Figure 4 provides descrip-
tive evidence on what motivates the dominant ﬁrm
to enter new markets. The ﬂattening or decline of
sales in classes where HP participates seems to precip-
itate new entry by HP. Combining this with Figure 3,
there appears to be three patterns in the data: (a) HP
enters a new segment when it experiences a slow-
down in sales growth in existing segments; (b) HP
extends its product line along the DPI dimension; and
(c) HP seems to avoid adjacent segments until it can
no longer do so while staying in the same DPI range.
These patterns are consistent with Hypotheses 1, 2,
3A, and 3B. Although the ﬁgures are useful evidence
for the theory, Table 2 presents a hazard rate estima-
tion to more rigorously test these hypotheses.
Model 1 provides a baseline piecewise exponential
hazard rate model with robust standard errors clus-
tered on the ﬁrm.10 Model 2 introduces the indepen-
9 We thank Glenn Carroll for advising us on this approach. The full
analysis and convergence to the pieces is available from the authors.
The results are robust to alternate hazard-rate speciﬁcations.
10 We present the exponentiated coefﬁcients from the hazard-rate
estimation rather than the hazard ratio for clarity.
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Table 1 Deﬁnition of Independent Variables and Summary of Predictions
Variable Deﬁnition Prediction
Industry-level variables
IndustryClockt Age of industry at time t , set equal to t – 1984
IndustryDensityt Number of ﬁrms in industry at time t
IndustryDensitySqt IndustryDensityt squared
NumSegmentsOpenedt Number of segments that have had at least one entry at time t
Class-level variables
ClassClockjt Age of class j at time t , set equal to t – year that class had
ﬁrst entrant
ClassDensityjt Number of ﬁrms in class j at time t
ClassDensitySqjt ClassDensityjt squared
SalesGrowthjt Unit sales in class j at time t minus unit sales in class j at
time (t − 1), divided by unit sales in class j at time (t − 1)
HPInClassjt One if HP competes in class j in year t , and zero otherwise H4: Negative in price model
H5: Positive in sales model
H6: Positive in entry count model
HPClockjt HP’s tenure in class j at time t , set equal to t – year that HP
entered class j
Firm-level variables
FirmAgeit Age of ﬁrm at time t , set equal to t – year that ﬁrm i ﬁrst
entered industry
FirmAgeSqit FirmAgeit squared
SalesGrowthInCurrentClassesit Sum of unit sales across all classes in which ﬁrm i
competes at time t minus sum of unit sales across same
classes at time (t − 1), divided by sum of unit sales across
same classes at time (t − 1)
NumClassesit Number of classes that ﬁrm i competes in at time t
HPDumi One if ﬁrm i is HP, and zero otherwise
Firm-class-level variables
SameDPIijt Number of classes that ﬁrm i already competes in at time t H2: Positive in entry model
that are in the same DPI row as class j , normalized
SamePPMijt Number of classes that ﬁrm i already competes in at time t
that are in the same PPM column as class j , normalized
Neighborijt One if, at time t , ﬁrm i already competes in at least one class H3A: Positive in entry model
that is directly adjacent to class j , zero otherwise
HPPrecederij One if ﬁrm i entered class j before HP has entered class j
(NB: if HP has not entered class j by 1996, then this is one
for all ﬁrms in class j , zero otherwise)
HPPrecederBeforeHPEntryijt One if ﬁrm i entered class j before HP has entered class j
and HP has not yet entered class j as of time t , zero otherwise
HPPrecederAfterHPEntryijt One if ﬁrm i entered class j before HP has entered class j H7: Positive in exit model
and HP has entered class j as of time t , zero otherwise
HP interaction variables
HP ∗SalesGrowthijt Interaction term between HPDum and SalesGrowth
HP ∗SalesGrowthInCurrentClassesit Interaction term between HPDum and H1: Negative in entry model
SalesGrowthInCurrentClasses
HP ∗SameDPIijt Interaction term between HPDum and SameDPI
HP ∗SamePPMijt Interaction term between HPDum and SamePPM
HP ∗Neighborijt Interaction term between HPDum and Neighbor H3B: Negative in entry model
dent variable SalesGrowthInCurrentClasses. Models 3–
5 introduce additional ﬁrm variables and HP-related
variables. Because a likelihood-ratio test indicates that
the explanatory power of Model 5 is greater than that
of preceding models, and because the magnitudes of
the coefﬁcients across these models are relatively sta-
ble, we direct our attention to Model 5.
The focal variables to test Hypothesis 1 are the
direct and interactive effects of SalesGrowthInCurrent-
Classes and HP∗SalesGrowthInCurrentClasses. The coef-
ﬁcient on the main effect is negative but not statis-
tically signiﬁcant. This suggests that fringe ﬁrms are
not motivated to enter new classes when sales growth
in their existing classes declines. However, the coef-
ﬁcient on the interaction term, HP ∗ SalesGrowthIn-
CurrentClasses, is large (in absolute value), statistically
signiﬁcant, and negative. This result is consistent with
Hypothesis 1; after controlling for a range of ﬁrm,
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Table 2 The Timing and Direction of Entry into a New Segment
Model
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Time piece 1 −18815∗∗∗ −19444∗∗∗ −18161∗∗∗ −18490∗∗∗ −17812∗∗∗
0454 0456 0484 0453 0440
Time piece 2 −5558∗∗∗ −5482∗∗∗ −4999∗∗∗ −5348∗∗∗ −5560∗∗∗
1266 1270 1323 1312 1261
Time piece 3 −2964∗∗∗ −2920∗∗∗ −2736∗∗∗ −3088∗∗∗ −3293∗∗∗
0481 0482 0485 0465 0465
Time piece 4 −2279∗∗∗ −2221∗∗∗ −2220∗∗∗ −2529∗∗∗ −2764∗∗∗
0525 0528 0559 0533 0533
Time piece 5 −0840 −0847 −1293∗ −1500∗∗ −1742∗∗
0676 0682 0743 0721 0718
IndustryClock −0309∗∗∗ −0308∗∗∗ −0433∗∗∗ −0379∗∗∗ −0352∗∗∗
0060 0060 0074 0065 0064
ClassClock −0092∗∗ −0090∗∗ −0097∗∗ −0151∗∗∗ −0171∗∗∗
0041 0041 0042 0045 0044
SalesGrowthInClass 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
ClassDensity 0137∗∗∗ 0136∗∗∗ 0142∗∗∗ 0111∗∗∗ 0108∗∗∗
0032 0032 0033 0032 0032
ClassDensitySq −0003∗∗∗ −0003∗∗∗ −0003∗∗∗ −0002∗∗∗ −0002∗∗∗
0001 0001 0001 0001 0001
SalesGrowthInCurrentClasses −0021∗ −0011 −0025 −0025
0011 0007 0017 0017
FirmAge 0294∗∗∗ 0182∗∗∗ 0183∗∗∗
0062 0042 0042
SamePPM 0661∗∗∗ 0494∗∗∗
0122 0148
SameDPI 0991∗∗∗ 0842∗∗∗
0097 0129
Neighbor 0498∗∗
0225
HPDum 0466 1212∗∗∗ 1394∗∗∗
0302 0256 0243
HP ∗SalesGrowthInClass 0000 0000 0000
0000 0000 0000
HP ∗SalesGrowthInCurrentClasses −0459∗∗∗ −0418∗∗∗ −0435∗∗∗
0060 0058 0059
HP ∗SamePPM −0447∗∗∗ −0093
0118 0140
HP ∗SameDPI −0589∗∗∗ −0149
0099 0140
HP ∗Neighbor −1267∗∗∗
0242
Na 11342 11342 11342 11342 11342
No. of failures 205 205 205 205 205
No. of subjects (ﬁrm-classes) 2248 2248 2248 2248 2248
No. of clusters in S.E. 120 120 120 120 120
Log-pseudolikelihood −51342 −51008 −47053 −41477 −41110
Notes. Piecewise exponential hazard-rate estimation with robust standard errors. Unit of observation: ﬁrm-class
year (∗p < 010, ∗∗p < 005, ∗∗∗p < 001).
aIncludes all ﬁrm-class years for which ﬁrm i was at risk of entering class j during year t . Once ﬁrm i enters
class j , it is not at risk of entering again. Firm i is not at risk of entering a new class until it is competing in at least
one segment in the industry. Thus, we exclude the pioneering entry of each ﬁrm into the industry.
class, and industry characteristics, the dominant ﬁrm
is more likely to enter a new class as sales growth in
its existing classes falls.
To test Hypothesis 2, we examine the variables
SameDPI and HP ∗ SameDPI, which measure the
extent to which a ﬁrm enters new product segments
in the same DPI range as its current products. Recall
that Hypothesis 2 applied to all ﬁrms seeking new
markets. The coefﬁcient on SameDPI is positive, with
the underlying hazard ratio indicating that a ﬁrm
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Figure 4 HP Printer Units Shipped by Year and Class (Data Not Collected Prior to 1987)
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is 132% more likely to pursue entry into segments
within its current DPI ranges than in other DPI
ranges. In Model 5, the coefﬁcient on HP ∗ SameDPI
is not statistically different from zero.11 As expected,
HP shows no greater or lesser tendency to stay within
its DPI range than fringe ﬁrms. The coefﬁcients for
SamePPM and HP ∗ SamePPM exhibit the same pat-
terns of sign, magnitude, and signiﬁcance, indicating
that ﬁrms are also more likely to enter segments in the
same PPM range as their existing segments. However,
the coefﬁcient for SameDPI is signiﬁcantly larger than
the coefﬁcient for SamePPM. Our operationalization
of Hypothesis 2 anticipated that ﬁrms would not only
be likely to enter segments in the same DPI range but
also more likely to enter these segments than those in
the same PPM range; we therefore interpret the above
as evidence supporting this hypothesis.
Our examination of Hypothesis 3 focuses on the
coefﬁcients on Neighbor and HP ∗Neighbor. The coef-
ﬁcient on Neighbor is large, positive, and statistically
signiﬁcant. A fringe ﬁrm is 104% more likely to enter
an adjacent segment than a segment further away.
Consistent with Hypothesis 3A, fringe ﬁrms choose
to enter adjacent markets, presumably to take full
advantage of opportunites to exploit existing tech-
nological assets or scope economies or both. How-
ever, the coefﬁcient on HP ∗ Neighbor indicates that
HP follows the opposite strategy. It is 71% less likely
than other ﬁrms to enter adjacent segments than seg-
ments further away. Combining the direct and inter-
active effects, the model demonstrates that HP is 41%
less likely to pursue adjacent segments than more
11 In Model 4, this coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant and negative,
but this effect goes away once we control for entry into neighboring
classes. This underscores HP’s aversion to entering adjacent classes.
distant ones. This is consistent with Hypothesis 3B,
which suggests that the dominant ﬁrm will skip adja-
cent segments to avoid cannibalization of current
products.
The remaining results from Table 2 also point to
several other factors inﬂuencing a ﬁrm’s entry deci-
sion. Consistent with prior research, we ﬁnd that den-
sity in a class has an inverted-U relationship with
the hazard of entry into that class. We also ﬁnd that
industry age and class age each have a negative rela-
tionship with entry.12 FirmAge has a positive coefﬁ-
cient, indicating that older ﬁrms are more likely to
diversify into new segments, while the current sales
growth in a focal segment (SalesGrowthInClass) has lit-
tle relationship with the probability of entry into that
segment.
4.1.2. Effect of Dominant Firm Entry on Price
and Sales. Hypotheses 4 and 5 predict that indi-
vidual segments will experience an accelerated price
decline and sales takeoff because of the dominant
ﬁrm’s entry. First, we examine the price trends with
descriptive data. Figure 5 presents the price trends
in a representative class, both for HP and for fringe
ﬁrms, and before HP and after HP. Note that there
seems to be a declining trend in price over time. HP’s
entry, however, is associated with a step-function
decrease in the price. (Graphs for all segments, avail-
able from the authors, show patterns that largely con-
form to Figure 5.) Table 3 presents the results of a
statistical test of these patterns. Model 1 provides a
baseline OLS estimation with class random effects.
12 When we include IndustryClockSq and ClassClockSq, all of the
clocks are signiﬁcant. No other coefﬁcients change in sign, magni-
tude, or signiﬁcance.
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Figure 5 Price Evolution in Class 22 (HP Enters 1993)
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Model 2 adds ClassDensity; the addition of this vari-
able does not improve the ﬁt of the model.13 Model 3
adds HPInClass and HPClock to identify the effect of
the dominant ﬁrm’s entry into the segment. Given the
construction of these two variables (as described in
Table 1), HPInClass captures the initial (shift) effect of
HP’s entry on segment price, while HPClock captures
how prices change in the segment (slope) as HP stays
in the segment. This model is a signiﬁcant improve-
ment over the ﬁrst two.
ClassClock has a negative and statistically signiﬁcant
coefﬁcient, indicating that the price of a laser printer
in a class falls over time. This result is consistent with
the general literature on technology goods witnessing
price declines over time. Consistent with the predic-
tion of Hypothesis 4, HPInClass has a negative coef-
ﬁcient that is statistically signiﬁcant, indicating that
HP’s presence in a segment is associated with lower
prices. The magnitude of this coefﬁcient is roughly
2.5 times the magnitude of the ClassClock coefﬁcient,
meaning that the entry of HP into a segment is asso-
ciated with a price drop that would take more than
2.5 years to occur in HP’s absence.
HPClock has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant
coefﬁcient that is roughly 40% of the magnitude of
ClassClock’s coefﬁcient (in absolute value terms). This
indicates that price, after plummeting upon HP’s en-
try, declines more gradually over time than it would
in the absence of HP. Although there is little extant
theory about the long-term effect of dominant ﬁrm
entry on prices, this pattern of steep initial price drop
and slower long-term rate of decline is consistent with
some prior empirical research concerning entry by a
low-cost player in the airline industry (Goolsbee and
13 ClassDensitySq is omitted because there is no theoretical rationale
for a nonlinear relationship between number of ﬁrms and price. Its
inclusion does not change the reported results.
Table 3 The Effect of Dominant Firm Entry on Price Within a Class
Model
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
ClassClock −37116∗∗∗ −36021∗∗∗ −46633∗∗∗ −46378∗∗∗
2300 2739 4095 4093
ClassDensity −679 1282 1112
911 1037 1038
HPInClass −113940∗∗∗ −102687∗∗∗
28901 29169
HPClock 19163∗∗∗ 17608∗∗∗
5008 5033
HPDum −149744∗∗∗
54120
HPDum ∗HPClock 25838∗∗∗
9424
Constant 623270∗∗∗ 625504∗∗∗ 671587∗∗∗ 672113∗∗
55537 56780 59481 59545
N 3210 3210 3210 3210
No. of groups 23 23 23 23
Random effects Class Class Class Class
Wald chi-square 26043∗∗∗ 26115∗∗∗ 28847∗∗∗ 29723∗∗∗
R2 004 003 003 003
Notes. OLS regression estimation with random effects (dependent vari-
able: Pricekjt ). Unit of observation: model-class year (∗p < 010, ∗∗p < 005,
∗∗∗p < 001).
Syverson 2005).14 This one-time drop and subsequent
lower rate of decline is also plausibly consistent with
circumstances in which Cournot competition between
high-cost ﬁrms is supplanted by Stackelberg compe-
tition between a high- and a low-cost ﬁrm for suf-
ﬁciently different levels of cost between high- and
low-cost ﬁrms.15
Having obtained substantial traction on Hypoth-
esis 4, we extend our analysis to examine HP’s
prices relative to other ﬁrms in the segment. In
Model 4, we introduce two new variables—HPDum
and HPDumClock—to determine whether HP’s print-
ers are priced differently than those of fringe ﬁrms.
HPDum is statistically signiﬁcant and negatively
related to price, with a coefﬁcient of nearly −1500.
HPDumClock is positively related to price, with a coef-
ﬁcient of 258. This implies that when HP ﬁrst enters
a segment, its printers are priced nearly $1,500 below
the average printer in that segment. Over time, this
price gap shrinks. This result is consistent with our
broader theory and with the price graph in Figure 5;
as current fringe ﬁrms lower prices, and are replaced
by new fringe ﬁrms that follow HP into the segment,
we would expect the price differential between HP
and the average fringe rival to shrink.
14 Goolsbee and Syverson (2005) ﬁnd that airfare prices on a route
decline rapidly in anticipation of, and at the time of, entry by South-
west into the market. After the drop at entry, prices then exhibit a
lower rate of decline.
15 Analytical results demonstrating this are available from the
authors.
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Figure 6 Firm Entry and Sales Takeoff in the Laser Printer Industry (Enter Industry: All Classes Combined)
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We now turn to Hypothesis 5, which predicts that
the dominant ﬁrm’s entry into a class will create a
substantial increase in sales in the class. Figure 6
shows that, as a single market, the desktop laser
printer industry sales pattern appears similar to that
found in other industries (Agarwal and Bayus 2002).
Thus, results from this industry are not likely to be
idiosyncratic to laser printers. Figure 7 shows simi-
lar information for a single class, and also indicates
the year of entry by HP. HP’s entry appears to pre-
cede both the bulk of fringe ﬁrm entry and the takeoff
in sales. (Graphs for all segments, available from the
authors, show patterns that largely conform to Fig-
ure 7.) Thus, although this class appears to exhibit a
pattern of entry and sales that is consistent with prior
research on the sales takeoff, inclusion of information
on HP’s entry raises the possibility that both fringe
ﬁrm entry and sales takeoff are triggered by dominant
ﬁrm entry. To explore this further, Table 4 describes
the magnitude of the sales takeoff across each class.
This table shows that classes that experience HP entry
have much higher peak sales (always occurring after
HP entry) than those that do not. Together, Figure 7
and Table 4 suggest that the existence and timing of
sales takeoff coincides with the entry of the dominant
ﬁrm. We explore this further through regression anal-
ysis in Table 5.
Model 1 in Table 5 provides a baseline OLS esti-
mation with class random effects; Models 2–4 include
additional variables. Because the coefﬁcients are rel-
atively stable across models and Model 4 offers the
best ﬁt, we focus our discussion on that model. Class-
Clock has a positive coefﬁcient and ClassClockSq has
a negative coefﬁcient, indicating that sales rise and
then fall as a class ages, with the inﬂection point
around 6.6 years. HPInClass has a positive, signiﬁ-
cant, and extremely large coefﬁcient, while HPClock
and HPClockSq are not signiﬁcant. This indicates that
HP’s entry into a class is associated with an astound-
ing 3,500% increase in sales, controlling for other fac-
tors. This dramatic increase in sales is consistent with
descriptive data found in Figure 7 and Table 4 and
also with Hypothesis 5.
4.1.3. The “Churn.” In our ﬁnal two predictions,
Hypotheses 6 and 7, we examine the churn in the seg-
ment created by the dominant ﬁrm’s entry. We predict
that incumbent fringe ﬁrms will tend to exit the seg-
ment when the dominant ﬁrm enters, while another
set of fringe ﬁrms will enter the segment and com-
pete in the shadow of the dominant ﬁrm. Table 6
presents the results of a negative binomial estimation
of entry by fringe ﬁrms into each class as a func-
tion of HP’s presence, among other characteristics.
Although Models 1–4 provide nonnested speciﬁca-
tions, they generate coefﬁcients that are remarkably
similar across models. We therefore focus our dis-
cussion on Model 4. In this model, HPInClass has a
positive and statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient. After
controlling for basic industry and class characteris-
tics, HP’s presence in a class is positively associated
with fringe ﬁrm entry into that class, as predicted
by Hypothesis 6. In addition, consistent with prior
research, we ﬁnd that ClassDensity and ClassDensitySq
exhibit positive and negative associations, respec-
tively, with entry into a class.
Finally, we examine the effect of dominant ﬁrm
entry on fringe ﬁrm exit. Hypothesis 7 predicts that
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Figure 7 Class 21—Dominant Firm Entry, Fringe Firm Entry, and Sales Takeoff (HP Enters 1989)
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after a dominant ﬁrm enters a segment, fringe ﬁrms
that preceded it into the segment will be more likely
to exit than fringe ﬁrms that follow it into the seg-
ment, ceteris paribus. Table 7 presents the results of a
piecewise exponential hazard rate model with robust
standard errors clustered on the ﬁrm to test this pre-
diction. Model 1 provides a standard baseline model.
IndustryClock is negatively related to exit, while Class-
Clock is positively related to exit. This suggests that
exit rates from an industry decline over time, but
ﬁrms accelerate their exit from old classes as new
classes open up (or as the dominant ﬁrm expands
into additional segments). Surprisingly, the density
of ﬁrms in a class exhibits an inverted-U relation-
ship with exit, which is contrary to the conventional
Table 4 Peak Annual Sales by Class
Classes that HP does
not enter by 1996
Classes that HP enters, 1984–1996
Year of
Class Peak sales Peak year HP entry Class Peak sales Peak year
9 1038626 1990 1984 5 396054 1995
1 981565 1991 1989 13 244958 1991
18 789467 1995 1992 14 127300 1993
10 754500 1993 1992 17 74911 1991
6 518829 1996 1995 7 25650 1996
2 516392 1995 1993 11 18570 1996
22 254579 1995 1993 20 9610 1994
24 119645 1996 1996 12 8065 1995
21 93054 1992 1989 23 <5000 1994
19 <5000 1995
3 <5000 1992
4 <5000 1993
15 <5000 1996
16 <5000 1996
result in populationwide studies.16 However, ﬁrm age
exhibits an inverted-U relationship with exit, consis-
tent with a liability of adolescence that has also been
found in prior literature. Other factors do not have a
signiﬁcant effect on fringe ﬁrm exit.
Model 2 adds HPPrecederij , which identiﬁes ﬁrms
that precede HP into a class. HPPreceder has a sig-
niﬁcant and positive coefﬁcient, indicating that ﬁrms
that precede HP into a class have a 107% higher
rate of exit than ﬁrms that follow HP. Note, how-
ever, that this variable does not vary with time; hence,
it does not distinguish between time periods before
the entry of HP and time periods after its entry.
We turn to the heart of the question in Model 3
where we replace HPPreceder with two time-varying
variables, HPPrecederBeforeHPEntryijt and HPPreceder-
AfterHPEntryijt . These variables permit us to observe
the effect of HP’s entry on fringe ﬁrms that precede it
into a class, and to compare before and after exit rates
to each other as well as to the unobserved category of
fringe ﬁrms that follow HP into a class. HPPreceder-
BeforeHPEntry has a positive coefﬁcient, but it is not
signiﬁcant. Exit rates for fringe ﬁrms in a segment that
HP has not yet entered are statistically indistinguish-
able from those for fringe ﬁrms that follow HP into
a segment. In contrast, HPPrecederAfterHPEntry has
a positive, signiﬁcant coefﬁcient of substantial mag-
nitude; after HP enters a segment, fringe ﬁrms that
preceded it are 128% more likely to exit than fringe
16 This may reﬂect the short post-HP-entry time period for sev-
eral classes in our sample. If we observe a swarm of followers in
the short term but do not observe a longer term segment-speciﬁc
shakeout, this could drive the result.
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Table 5 The Effect of Dominant Firm Entry on Sales Within a Class
Model
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
ClassClock 0767∗∗ 2923∗∗∗ 2686∗∗∗ 2806∗∗∗
0342 0573 0591 0504
ClassClockSq −0197∗∗∗ −0193∗∗∗ −0205∗∗∗
0080 0082 0078
ClassDensity 0121∗∗ 0074∗ −0004 0002
0051 0045 0046 0047
HPInClass 3312∗∗ 3889∗∗
1494 2017
HPClock 0093 −0273
0185 0183
HPClockSq 0035
0145
Constant 3766∗∗∗ −0371 −0321 −0515
1503 1410 1389 1379
N 163 163 163 163
No. of groups 23 23 23 23
Random effects Class Class Class Class
Wald chi-square 6114∗∗∗ 14579∗∗∗ 18080∗∗∗ 18156∗∗∗
R2 026 039 049 049
Notes. OLS regression estimation with random effects (dependent variable:
UnitSalesjt . Unit of observation: class year (∗p < 010, ∗∗p < 005, ∗∗∗p <
001).
ﬁrms that followed it, after controlling for ﬁrm age as
well as key class and industry characteristics. This is
consistent with the exit prediction of Hypothesis 7—
incumbent fringe ﬁrms will exit after the entry of the
dominant ﬁrm, while ﬁrms that enter with or after
the dominant ﬁrm will be less likely to exit, ceteris
paribus. Indeed, the combination of Hypotheses 6 and
7 generate churn in the industry.
Which fringe ﬁrms tend to precede HP into classes
and which tend to follow? It is beyond the scope of
this paper to explore this in detail. However, initial
difference-of-means tests on the preceder versus fol-
lower subsamples (available from the authors) reveal
differences between the two types of ﬁrms on four
characteristics for which we have data: compared to
followers, preceders are less likely to be members of
the Fortune 1000, less likely to be vertically integrated
into engine production, less likely to win awards for
their printers, and boast smaller patent portfolios.
This pattern is broadly consistent with an assump-
tion that followers are better suited to compete in a
post-HP environment where competition depends in
part on size. It is also consistent with an alternate
assumption that larger ﬁrms tend to delay entry into
a new segment until uncertainty associated with that
segment is resolved (Mitchell 1989). We leave further
exploration of fringe ﬁrm characteristics as one of the
most compelling areas for future research, and we
turn to alternative explanations below.
4.1.4. Alternative Hypotheses. Our theory pro-
poses that the dominant ﬁrm can create changes in
both the supply curve and demand curve, which in
Table 6 The Effect of HP’s Presence in a Class on Fringe Firm Entry
Model
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
IndustryClock −0064 −0089∗∗ −0037 −0074
0063 0043 0060 0057
IndustryDensity 0009 −0015 −0010
0013 0015 0014
IndustryDensitySq −0000 0000 0000
0000 0000 0000
ClassClock −0115 −0127 −0100
0072 0075 0077
ClassDensity 0120∗∗∗ 0126∗∗∗ 0093∗∗∗
0027 0031 0030
ClassDensitySq −0002∗∗∗ −0002∗∗∗ −0002∗∗∗
0001 0001 0001
SalesGrowthInClass 0000 0000 0000
0000 0000 0000
HPInClass 0603∗∗∗
0156
Constant 1369∗∗∗ 1469∗∗∗ 1683∗∗∗ 1652∗∗
0311 0339 0312 0349
N 139 139 139 139
Log-pseudolikelihood −29075 −27499 −27408 −26651
Wald chi-square 216 4475∗∗∗ 5550∗∗∗ 6662∗∗∗
Notes. Negative binomial estimation with robust standard errors (dependent
variable: EntryCountjt ). Unit of observation: class year (∗p < 010, ∗∗p <
005, ∗∗∗p < 001).
turn creates a wave of entry (and exit) by fringe ﬁrms,
a price decline, and a sales takeoff. There are four
alternative hypotheses that might explain the same
results. First, it could be that the sales takeoff is gener-
ated solely by the dominant ﬁrm shifting the supply
curve but having no effect on the demand curve. Sec-
ond, it could be that the fringe ﬁrms that enter con-
temporaneously with the dominant ﬁrm cause these
effects; the dominant ﬁrm entry is merely correlated
with these effects. Third, it could be that the sales
takeoff is caused by exogenous factors, and that the
dominant ﬁrm is a particularly good forecaster of
which segments will experience a takeoff. Fourth,
technological change could enable provision of print-
ers at low cost at a point in time, and this triggers
entry by a swarm of ﬁrms (including HP) as well as
the price decline and sales takeoff; this could be par-
ticularly pronounced if the demand curve is highly
inelastic at high prices and is highly elastic at lower
prices.17
Although we cannot conclusively rule out all of
these alternative hypotheses, we believe that the pre-
ponderance of evidence as found in our data and
analysis supports our explanation for the laser printer
industry.18 We base our interpretation primarily on six
17 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the fourth alter-
native explanation.
18 We address these at greater length in the electronic appendix.
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Table 7 Effect of HP Entry on Fringe Firm Exit from Class
(“HP Preceders” vs. “HP Followers”)
Model
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Time piece 1 −7279∗∗∗ −7805∗∗∗ −7597∗∗∗
1192 1228 1215
Time piece 2 −3401∗∗∗ −3842∗∗∗ −3631∗∗∗
1125 1162 1171
IndustryClock −0431∗∗∗ −0426∗∗∗ −0439∗∗∗
0118 0120 0121
ClassClock 0301∗∗∗ 0309∗∗∗ 0320∗∗∗
0109 0112 0113
SalesGrowthInClass 0081∗ 0115∗∗ 0107∗∗
0047 0053 0053
ClassDensity −0001∗ −0002∗∗ −0002∗∗
0000 0001 0001
ClassDensitySq −0000 −0001 −0000
0001 0003 0001
FirmAge 0607∗∗∗ 0589∗∗∗ 0575∗∗∗
0185 0186 0185
FirmAgeSq −0057∗∗∗ −0056∗∗∗ −0055∗∗∗
0018 0018 0018
NumClasses 0031 0031 0030
0078 0074 0073
Neighbor −0129 −0138 −0139
0294 0297 0298
HPPreceder 0730∗∗
0327
HPPrecederBeforeHPEntry 0375
0640
HPPrecederAfterHPEntry 0823∗∗
0348
Na 1931 1931 1931
No. of failures 65 65 65
No. of subjects (ﬁrm classes) 395 395 395
No. of clusters in std. errors 395 395 395
Log-pseudolikelihood −12415 −12201 −12183
Notes. Piecewise exponential hazard-rate estimation with robust standard
errors. Unit of observation: ﬁrm-class year (∗p < 010, ∗∗p < 005, ∗∗∗p <
001).
aIncludes all ﬁrm-class years for which ﬁrm i was at risk of exiting class j
during year t . Includes all classes whether or not HP entered during the sam-
ple frame. For classes in which HP never enters, HPPrecederij = 1, and for
all t , HPPrecederBeforeHPEntryijt = 1. This assumes that these classes are
at similar risk of HP entry as those that experienced HP entry. We also esti-
mate these models after restricting our sample to include only classes that
HP entered during our sample frame. The results of these models, available
from the authors, are qualitatively the same as those above.
facts. First, HP often enters classes that are adjacent
to, and more technologically challenging than, classes
that it skips (e.g., segment 18 versus segment 14). Sec-
ond, fringe ﬁrms that precede HP into a class tend to
exit after HP enters. Third, HP entry into a new seg-
ment is triggered by slowing growth in HP’s existing
classes. Fourth, Table 6 indicates that after control-
ling for HP, ClassDensity has no signiﬁcant association
with sales. Fifth, the sheer size of the sales takeoff
after dominant ﬁrm entry is immense—35× according
to our estimation. Sixth, Figure 5 shows that fringe
ﬁrms that follow HP price substantially below those
that precede HP.
The ﬁrst two facts work against the fourth alter-
native explanation. If technology has advanced suf-
ﬁciently to support low-cost production in class 18,
then it should also support low-cost production in the
similar but less complex Class 14. Yet we do not see
a wave of entry into that class in the absence of HP,
and peak sales in Class 18 exceed those of Class 14
by a factor of ﬁve. It is difﬁcult to reconcile this with
an exogenous-technology explanation. Further, if this
is explained by exogenous technological change, it is
difﬁcult to see why incumbent fringe ﬁrms should
exit as the takeoff occurs. As far as the good-forecaster
explanation, the third fact suggests that for this to be
correct, there would have to be systematic negative
correlation between a sales takeoff in a new segment
and a decline in sales in the existing segments—in
other words, each time HP experiences a decline in
existing segments, another segment is about to take
off. While this is theoretically possible, it is empiri-
cally unlikely.
Fact four suggests that the sales takeoff is not
driven by fringe ﬁrms that enter with HP. ClassDensity
is positively associated with increased sales when
variables for HP’s entry are omitted but its coefﬁcient
becomes insigniﬁcant when the model includes HP
variables. This implies that HP’s presence in a class,
and not the number of fringe ﬁrms, sparks the sales
takeoff. As for the possibility that the sales takeoff is
entirely driven by a shift in the supply curve (as pre-
vious authors suggest), we invoke facts ﬁve and six.
Fringe followers price well below fringe preceders,
implying that they are lower-cost producers. If HP’s
entry merely shifts the supply curve down, then it is
not clear why fringe followers wait for HP to enter—a
low-cost fringe ﬁrm could enter on its own and reap
the resulting beneﬁts. Further, the sales increase is so
large that a shift in supply curve without a shift in
demand (or change in demand elasticity) could only
generate such an increase if the demand curve was
already extraordinarily elastic.
5. Conclusion
This paper has sought to open a conversation on the
dynamic processes by which a segmented industry
evolves. To date, work on industry evolution has gen-
erally not dealt with this question. We propose that a
dominant ﬁrm, faced with slowing growth in its cur-
rent segment, will search for new segments in which
to employ its resources. The new segments it chooses
allow it to exploit its technological capabilities but
avoid cannibalization of its product line. The low-cost
dominant ﬁrm will introduce lower prices (and likely
alter demand through its other assets such as brand
image), which will, in turn, trigger a sales takeoff.
Incumbent fringe ﬁrms that are well suited to com-
pete in the absence of the dominant ﬁrm will exit
the segment; new fringe ﬁrms who are well suited
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to compete in the shadow of the dominant ﬁrm will
enter with or after the dominant ﬁrm. Thus, the entry
of the dominant ﬁrm causes churn in the segment. As
the market matures and growth slows in the segment,
the process repeats itself.
Evidence from the desktop laser printer industry
largely conforms to the predictions of this theory.
Overall, we ﬁnd that our seven theoretical predic-
tions enjoy both descriptive and statistical corrobo-
ration. We believe that on the whole, this is a good
outing and adds credibility to the idea that the theo-
retical insights of industry evolution can be extended
to a segmented industry by incorporating theories of
dominant ﬁrms that change industry structure and
create churn.
That said, in this initial exploration, we raise nearly
as many questions as we answer. Several are particu-
larly relevant as areas for future research in strategic
dynamics, particularly in the dynamics of segmented
industries. First, is the dominant ﬁrm equivalent to a
collection of fringe ﬁrms, or is it qualitatively distinct?
Although we present evidence that suggests domi-
nant ﬁrms are different, it is possible that the entry
of a group of low-cost fringe ﬁrms into a segment
could achieve the same results as the entry of a domi-
nant ﬁrm. Further exploration of this issue can help us
understand the extent to which the evolution of seg-
ment industries must involve integration of insights
from the dominant ﬁrm literature.
Second, what characteristics of fringe ﬁrms are
associated with preceding HP into a segment (and
then exiting upon HP’s entry) versus following HP?
Our initial exploration ﬁnds differences in four char-
acteristics related to ﬁrm size, ﬁrm scope, and patents.
Further exploration of this can help us better under-
stand the distinct patterns of fringe ﬁrm entry and
exit evident in this study, and can more broadly
help us to understand competitive interactions among
fringe ﬁrms.
Finally, this study suggests two avenues for further
research that draw on other literatures. Our empirical
test bed has had a single dominant ﬁrm throughout
our sample period. This enabled us to cleanly identify
the behavior of this ﬁrm and its effect on segmented
markets. However, in many industries, the dominant
ﬁrm changes over time as one ﬁrm eclipses another
(Henderson and Clark 1990, Christensen 1997). Such
competition for dominance will likely inﬂuence the
entry and pricing behavior of these ﬁrms. Integrating
work on dynamics of innovation with industry evolu-
tion in a segmented industry will likely be a produc-
tive avenue for future research. Relatedly, prior work
has found entry and exit rates to be highly corre-
lated (Dunne et al. 1988). Yet other literatures note an
asymmetry around industry “shocks” whereby ﬁrms
that precede the shock exhibit different exit rates than
ﬁrms that enter after the shock (Agarwal et al. 2002,
Nickerson and Silverman 2003, Utterback and Suarez
1995). We ﬁnd both correlation between entry and exit
rates post-HP entry, and also an asymmetry between
who exits and enters. More detailed elucidation of
these patterns should be a fruitful endeavor for schol-
ars to pursue.
6. Electronic Companion
An electronic companion to this paper is available as
part of the online version that can be found at http://
mansci.journal.informs.org/.
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